ABSTRACT
This chapter is concerned with vagueness as a problem for metaphysical realists, but it may be helpful to glance aside the responses of philosophers who reject one or another of the assumptions of metaphysical realism. Donald Davidson would reject the picture of truth as defined in terms of a single, antecedently-singled-out, relation of correspondence. Correspondence, being implicitly defined in terms of truth, is then likewise a vague notion. Coupled with Davidson’s repeated claim that the idea of comparing conceptual system and world is senseless, this amounts to a total rejection of the assumptions which make vagueness a problem for a certain traditional kind of realism. When logicians reflect upon the problem of vagueness, they encounter a problem which involves the actual use of language - something their training does not prepare them at all to deal with - and their instinct is to simplify the situation. The chapter discusses technical problem of logic for language containing vague predicates.
