ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses a familiar type of criticism of the notion of a semantic rule, and by way of contrast with the character of the difficulty for the governing view. It considers an obvious strategy for solving paradoxes in the Sorites group. The chapter argues that one class of predicate to which the second thesis attributes semantic incoherence is, in a certain sense, ineliminable. It presents some examples of predicates to which the second thesis attributes semantic incoherence. The chapter provides character of the incoherence. It shows that a seemingly promising adaptation of certain of Goodman’s ideas fails to provide an adequate refashioning of the semantics of these predicates; and that a simpler suggestion, while indeed liberating them from semantic incoherence, does so at the cost of generating other predicates with the same feature. There is no effectively decidable order among Goodman-Shades based on likeness.
