ABSTRACT
This chapter suggests that though not without value, the appropriation of Hobbes' teaching to the terms of rational choice theory reaps a good deal less than Hobbes attempted to sow. It considers the tenets of rational choice theory and Hobbes' account of man and society with an eye to exploring their similarities and differences. If, however, there were grounds for supposing that the formalization of Hobbes' argument not only obscures but actually undermines the lessons he wishes to teach, then it would matter a great deal, and one might reasonably call Hobbes a critic of rational choice theory. The essence of rational choice theory resides in three aspects: first, its instrumentalism, second, its individualism, and finally its subjectivism. Assuming the tenets of rational choice theory, can imagine a presociopolitical condition composed of mutually disinterested E-rational agents, and call it a state of nature. Any relationships or institutions have been explained as arising from the actions of such E-rational agents.
