ABSTRACT
According to Joel Feinberg, "Legal claim-rights are necessarily the grounds of other people's duties toward the right-holder. It seems clear that Feinberg regards the idea that one person's obligations are grounded on the legal rights of others as merely part of what he calls the doctrine of the logical correlativity of rights and duties. For if legal claim-rights are the grounds of obligations, then these rights are logically prior to the obligations to which they correspond, and statements about legal claim-rights will justify or explain appropriate statements about obligations. D. Daiches Raphael's distinction between "rights of action" and "rights of recipience" is suggestive of a more general and more useful distinction: that between rights that can be exercised and rights that cannot be. However, non-exercisable rights are not distinct from the obligations to which they correspond, and hence cannot serve as the grounds of those obligations.
