ABSTRACT
Focusing on Wittgenstein's writings from the late 1940s, this chapter examines the question of whether Wittgenstein can be considered a naturalist. Contrasting Wittgenstein's views with those of Quine, it argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is deeply critical of dominant forms of naturalism that have a reductionistic agenda and privilege the natural sciences as the ultimate level of explanation and justification. On the other hand, the chapter also argues that Wittgenstein was not unsympathetic to all forms of naturalism, and that his later philosophy can be read as a social, non-reductive sort of naturalism, a naturalism developed around the notion of second nature. It shows that what is at the core of this sui generis naturalism is a sociogenetic view of normativity. According to this naturalism, one can acquire a second nature by being socialized or acculturated in shared linguistic practices structured by norms. The chapter examines the philosophical significance of Wittgenstein's remarks about 'natural history'.
