ABSTRACT
In Tractatus Ludwig Wittgenstein describes epistemology as 'the philosophy of psychology'. One possibility is that he is alluding to the familiar conception of epistemology as the ethics of belief, the study of what one ought to believe. Wittgenstein's views are often schematic, taking the form of a framework in which certain concepts play central roles, a framework which in itself has no epistemological consequences. The chapter begins by looking briefly at two examples of how epistemic readings of Wittgenstein depend on interpreting key concepts in certain ways, the first involving the Tractatus and the second his later remarks on criteria and mental states. It then considers at somewhat greater length the status of On Certainty. The Tractatus presents an atomistic metaphysics in which the world consists of existing atomic states of affairs, which are possible configurations of simple 'objects'. The interpretation of On Certainty just considered exemplifies a pattern that has seen in the interpretation of Tractarian objects and criteria.
