ABSTRACT
In August 1945, even after the atomic bombings and Soviet entry, as the Suzuki government moved toward surrender, some military men outside Tokyo had pushed for a last battle, perhaps partly to undercut the peace move. When US Admiral William F. Halsey later read Toyoda's testimony, he found it supporting his own belief that the A-bomb had been unnecessary, that Soviet entry was not important, and that the planned invasion of Kyushu would have been avoided. On 11 December, Hisatsune Sakomizu, the Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Suzuki government, was interrogated. His answers stressed the role of the A-bomb in producing Japan's surrender in mid-August 1945. The critical examination of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) early-surrender counterfactuals focuses primarily on the pre-November 1945 conclusion, which has been heavily used by analysts of the A-bomb decision, and only secondarily and briefly on the less interesting thesis about a pre-31 December 1945 surrender, which has seldom been employed by such analysts.
