ABSTRACT
Alexius Meinong concedes that he had long believed that the two expressions 'content' and 'object' could be used almost interchangeably, but by 1899 he had become convinced that such an attitude was unjustified and thus that his earlier usage was inexact. Meinong calls the relation of a content to its corresponding object 'adequacy relation,' and he takes it to be an ideal relation. Meinong touches on a very difficult theme with far-reaching implications for a theory of abstraction when he speaks about imprecise employment of presentations. Meinong also accepts the purely mental, individual character of the psychological content. But in contrast to E. Husserl he believes that a certain name has always the same kind of mental content. Meinong and Husserl think that the act-component and the content-component are real. Twardowski however denies the reality of the content, although the content is supposed to form together with the act one single mental reality.
