ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a systematic account of Alexius Meinong's theory of the meaning of linguistic expressions within the framework of his theory of objects. It shows how Meinong's salient ideas can be accommodated within the more modern framework of a recursive theory of truth. Meinong distinguishes between the two modes of being which he calls 'existence' and 'subsistence'. Meinong regards the distinction between what a sign expresses and what it means as an important bulwark against psychologism. The intention is rather to produce a formal context within which to portray Meinong's major doctrines concerning meaning and truth. This indicates clearly that Meinong had a surprisingly sure intuitive grasp of the issues. Meinong developed significantly the theory of relations. It would therefore only be doing him justice to include a more comprehensive treatment of predicates having two or more places. This would then allow us to divide relations into constitutive and non-constitutive ones and even add relations which are partly constitutive.
