ABSTRACT
Christian von Ehrenfels is very cautious in singling out material feeling-dispositions as anthropological constants that would guarantee a uniform direction of ethical valuation in all human beings. It seems however likely to him that in our present cultural world at least most, though certainly not all feeling-dispositions that are favorably valued, are types of love and sympathy for other people, of compassion regarding their weal and woe. Ehrenfels' refutation of value-absolutism applies a double strategy. He shows how its origin can be psychologically explained as the natural result of psychical leanings at work also in other cases. Meinong A. 1894 Psychological-Ethical Investigations on Value Theory offers a theory that has, as far as its concrete elaboration is concerned, but astonishingly little in common with the specific arguments introduced by Ehrenfels. The principle of value theory is 'the principle of the relativity of all values'. This means that the phenomenon of value only emerges in connection with two poles.
