ABSTRACT
With the publication in 1957 of Laws and Explanation in History, W. H. Dray set the stage for what has become the primary debate at the centre of contemporary philosophy of history in the Anglo-American world. Among the many reactions against this view – commonly referred to as positivism – the most significant and daring, in Dray’s estimation, is Alan Donagan’s attempt to defend the autonomy of history by demonstrating that historical explanations can be deductive without the requirement of covering laws. At the same time, Dray agrees with Donagan’s contention that it is not enough for philosophers to prescribe ex cathedra what historians must (or ought to) be doing whenever they engage in explanations. It may be argued, first of all, that although historical explanations often vary, the science of historiography may eventually produce criteria by means of which transcendental authority will be given to one particular point of view.
