ABSTRACT
Rational choice theories could be improved, their scope broadened, and their explanations made more powerful by asking not only 'How do people go about getting what they know they want?' but also 'Why do people want what they want in the first place?'. The advantages of combining a theory of goal direction, which is the operational base of rational choice, and a theory of preference formation are manifold: a monistic conception of cause as self-interest is replaced by a pluralistic conception of culture allowing for a variety of motives for action; master objectives, which play out over a sequence of moves, supersede immediate objectives that cover only the next act; concentration on how institutional rules influence incentives, though valuable in and of itself, gives way to a parallel consideration of how individuals shape institutions; and the overwhelming concentration on material self-interest, which discomforts so many social scientists who might otherwise be well disposed to rational choice explanations, opens up into a diversity of selves who construct a variety of interests in the service of different ways of life (or cultures).
