ABSTRACT
The term 'anti-realism' is ugly enough to scare away the faint hearted; but it is at least as well established as any of the suggested alternatives: irrealism, internalism, perspectivism, conceptual relativism, and so forth. It is widely agreed that Kant is the paradigmatic anti-realist. To define a realism that is incompatible with Kantian anti-realism we will require a double thesis, first metaphysical and then epistemic. Theological realism, our present concern, would be the special case of this double thesis applied to God. Of course, when one denies the independent reality of this or that entity, say universals, or the theoretical entities of sub-atomic physics, or God, one has denied the first thesis of realism as defined above with reference to that entity. In Kant's own distinction between divine and human knowing the contrast between time and eternity is at least as basic as that between finite and infinite.
