ABSTRACT
This essay examines the relative power of the Rhodian and Ottoman fleets in the first decades of the sixteenth century, taking as its context the commercial and diplomatic relations of the eastern Levantine states. After the Aegean wars of 1499-1503 Rhodes failed to mobilize a christian alliance against the Ottomans. Nor did the rise of Ismail Safavi in Iran provide the hoped for relief from Ottoman expansion. While the Ottoman state was preoccupied with the succession struggle for Bayezid's throne and with plans to extend its hegemony to the Indian Ocean, Rhodes was fighting for survival. Although the development of the Ottoman fleet provoked great fear in Rhodes, Venice and the Mamluk kingdom, Ottoman naval power until the conquest of Cairo in 1517 was directed primarily to defensive and transport activities. Further the Ottoman fleet provided security against corsairs for merchant shipping. By supporting the corsair activities of Order members, Rhodes alienated the Mamluk state, Venice and France (all potential allies in an anti-Ottoman coalition) but refrained from directly challenging the Ottoman navy. Naval engagements during this period cannot be understood without taking into consideration the prolonged conditions of grain shortage in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. Both aggressive and defensive measures taken by the Ottoman, Venetian and Rhodian fleets were ordinarily related to the competition for foodstuffs during this period rather than the conquest of territory or the establishment of commercial dominance (as in the Indian Ocean).
