ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses an exercise in ‘applied Frankfurtianism.’ One of the classic puzzles raised by the theistic conception of God is whether infallible foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom. At the heart of Harry Frankfurt’s argument lies a peculiar kind of counterexample. The best-known of these counterexamples goes something like this. Two judgments about BSJ are integral to Frankfurt’s argument. One is that Jones is unable to refrain from killing Smith. The other judgment is that Jones may nevertheless remain morally responsible for killing Smith. The Frankfurt objection to theological fatalism is therefore at least semi-correct. The Frankfurt objection does misrepresent the situation in one respect, however. Its reliance on Frankfurt’s critique of principle of alternate possibilities’ (PAP), for purposes of defeating the argument for theological fatalism, looks initially like a case in which developments in the metaphysics of freedom provide succour to a crisis in philosophical theology.
