ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author seeks to advance the debate over the strength of Harry Frankfurt’s attack on principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) in several ways. He considers some new attempts to provide examples of IRR-situations. The author provides a comprehensive defense of PAP for one sense of ‘morally responsible,’ that of moral blameworthiness. If alternative expectations, principle of (PAE) is correct, it enables the PAP-defender to answer an important recent objection to PAP by John Martin Fischer. Fischer’s objection is ingenious. However, it is not difficult to anticipate the PAP-defender’s response to it. Fischer assumes that in the situation he is envisaging it is intuitively clear that the agent is blameworthy for the decision he made. There is a widely held view among moral philosophers that Frankfurt’s attack on PAP constitutes a definitive refutation of the traditional libertarian conception of freedom and moral responsibility.
