ABSTRACT
Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) were introduced to undermine ‘the principle of alternative possibilities’ (PAP). They were designed to show that a person could be morally responsible even though the person had no alternative possibilities (APs) or could not have done otherwise. In this chapter, the author suggests a different kind of objection to Frankfurt-style cases that had not until then been considered in the literature. He defends that objection against their well-known counterexample and counterexamples of similar kinds. The author tries to vindicate the intuitive belief that some APs are indeed necessary for moral responsibility and free will. He discusses the Mele/Robb example as if it were a pure blockage case, as some have in fact taken it to be, and criticize it accordingly. Since Frankfurt proposed the first FSC in 1969, many responses were made in an attempt to salvage PAP or some variant of it.
