ABSTRACT
A perennial ethical issue for senior US military officers lies in the tension between their responsibility to cultivate and offer professional military advice, on the one hand, and their Constitutional subordination to civilian leaders who may or may not heed military advice. In some periods (e.g., the end of the Clinton Administration), the military’s dissatisfaction with their civilian masters is great. In those moments, concerns are raised that the military may subvert the will of civilian leaders (probably in subtle ways). At other historical moments (some would argue the current war in Iraq is one such moment), the concern is the opposite: that the military’s subordination to civilian leaders may lead them to acquiesce in policies that their professional military judgment causes them to think unwise or misguided. This paper articulates some constant standards to guide that debate. The authors argue that it is important to remind military leaders that their loyalties and subordination under the US Constitution is not only to the President, Secretary of Defense, and other members of the Executive Branch of government. In addition, the Constitution clearly requires and expects that senior military leaders will give unvarnished and honest professional opinions to the Congress—even if that irritates the Administration. But further difficulties remain because the Administration itself appoints senior military leaders. This paper attempts to distinguish the in principle question of the ethical requirement that senior leaders give honest and direct professional advice from the real-world reality that officers may require moral courage and a willingness to experience displeasure and even dismissal from their positions if they do so.
