ABSTRACT
One of the most significant theories of distributive justice to have emerged since the publication of A Theory of Justice is the form of distributive egalitarianism that Elizabeth Anderson has dubbed "luck egalitarianism". Luck egalitarianism overlaps with but also diverges from the prevailing political morality in most liberal societies, both with respect to the unacceptability of inequalities deriving from people's circumstances and with respect to the acceptability of inequalities deriving from their choices. This chapter summarizes a familiar version of the recent history of political philosophy—a version that locates the origins of luck egalitarianism in Rawls's thought but insists that he himself fails to develop the view in a consistent or thoroughgoing way. It presents some reasons for doubting the plausibility of the luck-egalitarian position. The chapter expresses that any form of distributive egalitarianism, if it is to be persuasive, must be rooted in a more general conception of equality as a moral value or normative ideal.
