ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that none of the explanations, and even the implied criticisms of Hannah Arendt’s political thought that they contain, are adequate in understanding the philosophical motivations behind Arendt’s stance on Little Rock. Arendt’s awareness of the dilemmas makes it more difficult for us some thirty-five years later to dismiss her arguments with the ease of most her contemporaries. The main differences between plural and singular consent can be illustrated in light of Arendt’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of judgment. Arendt’s insistence on the rule of law should also be understood in light of her pluralism. The best way to judge whether Arendt’s discussion of desegregation represents a good or bad proposed compromise is to look first at several instances of compromises that are consistent with common citizenship. The arguments of Arendt’s “Reflections on Little Rock” are significantly more complex than both them few defenders and many detractors make them out to be.
