ABSTRACT
In the second half of the sixteenth century the Venetian oligarchy renounced territorial expansion. The idea of neutrality acquired more and more acceptance, until it became an integral part of the ‘myth’ of good government that the Venetian Republic was anxious to encourage. At the Peace of Italy of 1530, Venice obtained an important acknowledgement of its dominion on the Lombard and Venetian mainland from Emperor Charles V, and when in 1536 he decided to seize the Milan territories, Venice preferred disengagement to the risk represented by a clash with the Habsburgs and the Papacy. The Republic’s position in foreign politics became purely defensive, in the name of the protection of peace in Italy and of the noble principle that ‘wars should be avoided’, words written by the ambassador in Rome, Bernardo Navagero, in 1558. Between 1530 and the end of the century Venice never engaged openly in battle, despite sixteen moments of crisis which demanded a preventive mobilisation of troops.1 There were two important exceptions – and both cases dealt with the advance of the Ottoman empire on the sea.
