ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the procedural interpretation leads to the first horn of the dilemma: it is associated with a plausible and fairly minimal account of harm, but it does not support the view that ending the harm in question would eradicate world poverty. In World Poverty and Human Rights, Pogge sides with libertarians on the question of normative principle. He agrees with libertarians that the most stringent obligation of the well-off is to avoid harming the poor. Pogge's strategy is appealing. The chapter shows why this strategy is ultimately unsuccessful. It also argues that Pogge faces the following dilemma: Either his normative principle is reasonably minimal, but is, his claims to the contrary notwithstanding, unlikely to generate obligations that, if acted upon, would come close to eradicating global poverty; Or his normative principle does generate a strong and extensive set of obligations to the global poor, but is not nearly so minimal or plausible as he maintains.
