Hegel’s Theory of Moral Action, Its Place in his System and the ‘Highest’ Right of the Subject

This chapter explains that G. W. F. Hegel offers, in his mature lectures on right, a hermeneutical theory of action. Hegel introduces the right of objectivity and its relation to the rational order prior to the critique of Kant in particular and subjective moralities in general. The chapter aims to show that Hegel's immanent doctrine of duty arose not just from his rejection of transcendental ethics but also from his own account of human moral action. The proper consideration of the right of intention seems to put pay to the strong criticism of Hegel's social philosophy, but this idea is rarely the motivation behind the apologist approach of many of his supporters. The two central concepts of the third section of the Philosophy of Right—that is, subjective and objective freedom—originate from the rights of knowledge, intention and objectivity of action which characterize the abstract moral will.