ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the venerable but still not entirely resolved issue of G. W. F. Hegel's relationship to liberalism. In contradistinction to recent communitarian accounts, the Kantian and Enlightenment idea of rational freedom in Hegel's political philosophy is shown to be the basis for Hegel's critique of traditional liberalism. The relevance of Hegel's ideal of the rational state to our understanding of contemporary liberalism and its discontents is assessed. Hegel's critique of liberalism focuses on the individualism upon which it rests. In his critique, this liberal individualism presents two different aspects, not always clearly distinguished by Hegel himself. The chapter examines the role of subjective freedom in Hegel's political philosophy has yielded two important conclusions concerning Hegel's complex relationship to liberalism. The rational freedom which is realized in the Hegelian state is not inimical to subjective freedom—indeed, it derives its greatest strength and depth from being conjoined to subjective freedom—but neither is it simply identical or reducible to subjective freedom.
