ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the way in which G. W. F. Hegel locates the freedom of the will not in the will's giving itself a law but in the types of objects of the will. It presents the way in which Hegel interprets the principle of respect for persons differently than Kant; the way in which Hegel extends the Kantian categorial program to social and political philosophy. The arguments about personhood rest on more general considerations not provided in the Philosophy of Right about what would explain the possibility of such an acknowledgment of others as persons. These arguments are to be found in the "Master-Slave" section of the Phenomenology; there Hegel makes the claim, that mutual acknowledgment of people as ends in themselves is possible only within a higher unity of selves and world. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel gives an account of a form of Kantian moral theory in a section labeled "Morality".
