ABSTRACT
In Trinko, the Supreme Court makes two central points. First, it clarifies its approach on unilateral refusals to deal, significantly limiting the circumstances in which antitrust law forces a firm to assist its competitors by providing access to its infrastructure. Second, the Court appears to limit the scope for anti-trust intervention when a sector-specific regulatory regime is already present as is generally the case in network industries. The important theme addressed in Trinko relates to the interface between competition law and sector-specific regulation. The important theme relates to the question of whether or not dominant firms should be compelled to give access to essential inputs that are not available to their competitors. Mandatory access has also been a central issue in US antitrust law where the essential facilities doctrine originated about century ago. The "essential facilities" doctrine has, on many occasions, been relied upon by the Commission to force dominant firms to give access to physical infrastructures to their competitors.
