ABSTRACT
Western philosophers have typically held that human beings are the only proper objects of human moral concern. Those who speak of duties generally hold that one has duties only to human beings, and that their apparent duties towards animals, plants and other nonhuman entities in nature are indirect duties to human beings. The primary line of argument is presented by the contemporary animal-rights advocates, and suggests that their conclusions must be amended in the way as examined in this chapter. The chapter presents two arguments for distinguishing between the rights of human beings and those of nonhuman animals. It considers the animal liberationists' objection that any such distinction will endanger the rights of certain "nonparadigm" human beings, for example, infants and the mentally incapacitated. The chapter examines the moral theory implicit in the land ethic, and argues that it may be formulated and put into practice in a manner which is consistent with the concerns of the animal liberationists.
