ABSTRACT

This chapter concerns the debate between Atomism and Extensionalism and discusses the Extensionalist Theory of temporal experience. It argues that the Atomist Theory cannot simultaneously account for two important features of perceptual experience: Temporal Presence, and negative Temporal Transparency. The negative feature of Temporal Transparency is the claim that one cannot distinguish between the temporal location of a perceptual experience and the apparent temporal location of its object. The problem facing the Memory Theory, however, is that it is inconsistent with Temporal Transparency. The Memory Theory, while avoiding the problems concerning Temporal Presence that trouble the Specious Present Theory, is ultimately itself unsatisfying, as it is inconsistent with the Temporal Transparency of temporal experience. The root of the problems facing the Atomist Theory in both its Specious Present Theory and Memory Theory incarnations is its commitment to the thought that the temporal extent of experience and the apparent temporal extent of its object are not identical.