ABSTRACT
In Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume offered an empiricist account of time as a manner of appearance of sensations. In Treatise 1.3, he made a new beginning. He appealed to phenomenological considerations cited on John Locke's authority. Locke accepted that ideas have duration and that time can pass and be thought to pass even when there is no succession in ideas. Like Locke's, Hume's view that the idea of time arises from the experience of succession raises a difficult question about the nature of that experience. However, he did appeal to the mechanisms author has appealed to – habituation, the formation of expectations and the projection of feelings – when accounting for such related phenomena as causal inference, the understanding of abstract terms and the attribution of necessitating power to causes. They can serve as a Humean way of defending Hume's account of temporal experience as having experiences over time rather than having experiences of time.
