ABSTRACT
Shadworth Hollway Hodgson may have been the first philosopher to develop an account of the temporal structure of experience and to explicitly relate the temporal characteristics of consciousness to the body and brain. His account of temporal experience is historically significant in its own right. This chapter presents an overview of the motivation for Hodgson's work, in terms of its relationship to early modern rationalism, empiricism, and idealism, since that motivates much of his proto-phenomenological method. It discusses a series of key ideas that are distinctive to Hodgson's account of temporal experience, and compares some of these features to Husserl's account. Hodgson's work strikingly prefigures many key parts of Husserl, both in methodology and in the details about the character of temporal experience. The Hodgsonian account of temporal experience offers a new version of phenomenology that is the completion of a familiar form of British empiricism, explicitly developed in responses to figures such as Descartes, Hume, and Kant.
