ABSTRACT
This chapter proposes a real flow-based approach to capture redistributions of flows in container shipping networks under disruption and a game-theoretic approach for the quantitative measurement of transport vulnerabilities using an attacker-defender model (ADM). The ADM consists of a two-player, non-cooperative, mixed-strategy game between a malevolent agent (attacker) which tries to maximise disruption costs and a global network router (defender) seeking to minimise routing costs. The chapter improves previous formulations of the cost-based container assignment model (CBCAM) for the analysis of liner shipping disruptions by introducing additional dependency parameters to the network links defined by Bell et al., and Angeloudis et al. The main contribution of this work is the development of a quantitative framework capable of identifying the most vulnerable components in liner shipping networks and measuring the extent to which disruptions hamper the ability of the network to re-route cargo flows.
