ABSTRACT

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts covered in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book examines and critically assesses the role of scientism — or, rather, anti-scientism — in various areas of Wittgenstein's thought, including his conceptions of the nature of philosophy and philosophical methodology, early and late, and, in the case of his later philosophy, in his philosophy of mind and his views on meaning. It offers comparative studies of Wittgenstein's views on scientism with other philosophers, such as Paul Feyerabend; some examine the place of Wittgenstein's views on scientism within his thought or worldview as a whole; and some apply Wittgenstein's criticisms of scientism to contemporary debates both within and outside philosophy. The book argues that in Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations he sets up a paradox that undermines both Platonistic and naturalist conceptions of what meaning is thought to consist in.