ABSTRACT
This chapter presents a short summary of the theoretical issues analyzed in Israeli–Hezbollah case. It details the credibility problem in each case and how, and whether, it was resolved. The chapter discusses the light each case sheds on the different theoretical issues in the deterring terrorism literature. It evaluates the American failure to establish deterrence in Afghanistan and Iraq in light of the findings from these cases. The chapter discusses the puzzle why deterrence worked against Hezbollah while it did not work as well against an exceedingly weaker actor such as Hamas. It argues that one of the measures of deterrence success is not just the partial or complete cessation of military engagements but also a reorientation in the Violent Non-state Actor (VNSA's) political aspirations and goals as a result of an effective deterrence campaign. The chapter shows that over time deterrence interactions can induce learning in both challengers and defenders, which moves the actors to eventually put their conflict on hold.
