ABSTRACT
Both Huw Price and Paul Horwich see themselves as anti-representationalists and anti-metaphysicians, views that they also see as inspired by or as having affinities with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. They differ, or would appear to, with respect to the question of naturalism, Price calling himself a ‘subject naturalist’, Horwich apparently rejecting naturalism, at least of a substantive variety. After presenting Price’s argument that placement metaphysics depends on representationalism and his alternative ‘global expressivist’ account of discourse, I consider Horwich’s objections to the argument and Price’s response. I argue that Horwich’s objections though suggestive do not succeed as they stand, and that his view is actually (on plausible assumptions) not as far from the kind of neo-Carnapian position Price defends. However, I go on to argue that Horwich is basically right that, at least given Price’s commitment to naturalism, a form of placement metaphysics is still viable even once one rejects representationalism, though, further, that Horwich’s Wittgensteinean critique of “T-philosophy” does not substantially impact on this assessment. Finally, I present my own take on the issues, inspired in part by Chomsky’s conception of science and scientific enquiry, briefly defending a picture which promises to combine anti-representationalism and naturalism with a consistent rejection of metaphysics.
