ABSTRACT
The overall thesis of the paper is that it is illuminating and defensible to describe Wittgenstein as a naturalist. The relevant notion of naturalism is first sketched according to which to be a naturalist about a domain D is to hold that facts about D are reducible to natural facts. It is argued that a well-known discussion by David Pears of Wittgenstein’s naturalism does not clarify in what sense Wittgenstein is a naturalist. Some evidence is then presented for saying that Wittgenstein’s treatment of meaning and rule-following seem to be naturalistic in the explained sense. The opposing argument that Wittgenstein cannot be counted a naturalist because he is opposed to philosophical theories is then set out, and some considerations brought against it. More evidence of his naturalism is then presented. It is finally argued that Wittgenstein’s naturalism is too restrictive to accept, but that the phenomena he treated naturalistically should be so treated.
