ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the use of rational choice approaches to study international organization (IO) and global governance with special attention to principal–agent (PA) and orchestration theory. PA models investigate the circumstances under which states delegate problems to IOs. The chapter discusses rational choice as an approach to international politics, including through its use of models. It looks at PA models of state–IO relations, which represent some of the most important applications of rational choice to IR. The chapter presents a simple example of states using an IO to distribute development aid, examines the advantages and pitfalls of their doing so, and considers extensions of the model to situations involving multiple principals and/or agents as well as delegation chains. It considers three prominent alternative frameworks, which envision IOs as bureaucracies, trustees, or orchestrators. The chapter concludes that rational choice provides a valuable and progressive framework for understanding global governance that can be adapted to the many different circumstances of international politics.
