ABSTRACT

We introduce here a special issue of this journal on the theme of ‘Conceptual Meta-

phor and Embodied Cognition in Science Learning’. The idea for this issue grew out

of a symposium that we organized on this topic at the conference of the European

Science Education Research Association (ESERA) in September 2013. The eight

papers collected in this issue reflect the emergence of a critical mass of studies in

science education applying ideas from the perspective of ‘embodied cognition’ in cog-

nitive science. Up until the 1980s, most research in cognitive science assumed a view

of the mind as an abstract information processing system. On this view, our sensori-

motor systems were often seen as serving a peripheral, input/output role, conveying

information to or from a central cognitive processor where abstract, higher level

thought took place. The research focused on developing models of cognition incor-

porating language-like, propositional representations and syntactic processes, and

largely ignored the specifics of human physiology and interaction between the

person and the material and social world in which he or she thinks and acts. Since

then, several different approaches to cognitive science have adopted some version

of the assumption that cognition is embodied-that is, they have assumed that

models of cognition need to attend to the characteristics of human brains and

bodies, and the material contexts in which thought is taking place (e.g. Barsalou,

2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Shapiro, 2011; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991;

Wilson, 2002). The broad assumptions behind embodied cognition are not new to

the study of the mind and may be traced back to Merleau-Ponty’s (1962/2002) Phe-

nomenology of perception andGibson’s (1979) ecological theory of perception. They are

also acknowledged in cognitive developmental traditions, such as the Piagetian

emphasis on our sensorimotor system as a basis for the development of abstract con-

cepts, and resonate with Vygotsky’s (1978) recognition of the role of our interaction

with physical and symbolic artifacts. With regard to the educational sciences, certain

ideas of embodied cognition are in line with pragmatic and progressive traditions, for

example, those of Dewey (1916) which emphasize the role of personal and physical

experiences in learning.