ABSTRACT
Introduction Japan was the largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) donor in the world throughout the 1990s. From the beginning of Japan’s engagement in 1954,2 foreign policy makers, especially those affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), constantly endeavoured to underline the importance of Japan’s ODA as an indispensable humanitarian instrument for alleviating global poverty and human suffering. Japan’s efforts, mostly in the form of loans, clearly had a positive impact on the economies of developing countries, especially those in Asia. However, it is undeniable that Japan used its ODA in the pursuit of its own interests. As a country that had abandoned any aspiration to become a military power, Japan had to rely on ODA as a primary tool of its foreign policy. In the post-1945 era, ODA was used to rebuild relations with neighbouring countries in Asia that distrusted Japan on account of its previous imperialist conduct. Used as a form of reparation,3 it paved the way to resources and markets in Southeast Asia. According to David Arase, ODA played a central role in advancing Japan’s economic power. It helped establish a wide production and trade network in Asia, relativizing the country’s comparative disadvantages, most notably its lack of natural resources and high labour costs (Arase 1995, pp. 142-146). Japan’s ODA mirrored the basic policy of unarmed neutrality set by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, which later became known as the Yoshida Doctrine. Following this doctrine, Japan focused mainly on promoting its economic growth, while leaving military defence to the United States. To use the analogy of a former deputy minister at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),4 Naohiro Amaya (1979-1981), Japan was to exercise its power as a merchant nation, leaving power politics to samurai nations such as the USA or the Soviet Union (Amaya 1980). Although the country had the economic potential to become a samurai nation, it refrained from participating in “power games”, thus earning the reputation of being a pacifist country or civilian power (Maull 1990). Against this backdrop, Japan used its ODA largely to enhance its national economic growth by supporting the economic advancement of neighbouring countries through the development of economic infrastructure such as roads,
bridges, dams, railways, port facilities and power plants. This was necessary to gain access to the valuable natural resources Japan was lacking. Eventually, these projects promoted the free movement of goods and capital, allowing Japan to implement an economic strategy – best described as the Flying-Geese Model – that was strongly influenced by the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu, according to which the promotion of economic development in Asia would eventually lead to positive economic synergies (Akamatsu 1962). Because Japan was mainly pursuing economic interests, it was reluctant to attach political conditions linked to human rights or good governance to its ODA. This stood in sharp contrast to other donors, such as the USA.5 Just like the country’s foreign policy in general, Japan’s ODA was characterized by its passive and low-profile stance.6 This explains why Japan’s position as a globally leading ODA donor was barely noticed internationally. The lack of field expertise as well as the long-lived request-based system demonstrated Japan’s reluctance to become involved in the internal affairs of other countries.7 In fact, until the 1990s Japan did not use its ODA as an instrument of political sanction, either positive or negative (Nikitina and Furuoka 2008). This neutral political stance was a way for Japan to maintain its autonomy and independence to the greatest extent possible in order to benefit from economic relations with countries beyond the ideological fringes of the international stage.8 A general ODA strategy was not formulated until 1992, when Japan published its first ODA Charter – four decades after the country became active as a donor. This long-delayed announcement of an official ODA policy indicates that there was domestic resistance to the creation of general rules that may have limited the use of ODA as an economic tool (Arase 1995, p. 166). On 13 December 2013, Japan signed an ODA loan agreement amounting to 18.7 billion yen with the Republic of the Philippines to provide ten new patrol vessels. On 1 August the following year, Japan signed a non-project grant agreement with Vietnam for the provision of six refurbished vessels worth 500 million yen (MOFA 2015c). The provision of these boats was part of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s new political doctrine, announced in Jakarta in January 2013.9 One of its key principles is to protect the “open, free, and peaceful” seas from the “rule of might”. To a large extent this doctrine was addressing China’s growing assertiveness in the region. Consequently, for the sake of “free and peaceful” seas, trilateral cooperation among the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, the USA and Japan needed to be strengthened (Kantei 2013b). This utilization of ODA for security purposes is not a completely new feature. In a wider sense ODA has long been an indispensable tool in ensuring national security, especially after the oil crisis in the 1970s, when Japan included its ODA in the “comprehensive security” strategy outlined by a task force appointed by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (1978-1980). This group came to understand that the destabilization of certain areas in the world could affect Japan’s complex resource and trading network. As a result, Japan diversified its aid to include strategically important countries, such as China, Egypt, Jamaica, Kenya,
Somalia, South Korea, Sudan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Akaha 1991, pp. 332-333). However, the case of capacity building measures that included the provision of patrol boats stood in clear contrast with previous ODA efforts that were strictly limited to non-military areas. The provision of patrol vessels to the Philippines and Vietnam has a military dimension, even if the official statements declare differently. They are defined as “military vessels” under the Export Control Trade Ordinance definition of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (METI 2005). The government argues that coastguards are part of law enforcement agencies under civilian jurisdiction, making the support a non-military contribution. At least in the case of Vietnam this argument is debatable, however, since the coastguard in Vietnam comes under the control of the country’s Ministry of National Defence (Global Security 2015). In whatever way the use of ODA to provide patrol boats may be defined from a legalistic standpoint, it is obvious that it represents a new balancing strategy against China, which is becoming increasingly assertive in its territorial claims in the region. By means of patrol boat provision and coastguard training, Japan is supporting the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region. The relevance of Japan’s ODA in the new regional security strategy was emphasized in the Japanese-US 2 + 2 Joint Statement of October 2013, which set out the future plans of both countries:
The Ministers welcomed the strategic use of Official Development Assistance by Japan, such as providing coastal patrol vessels and training for maritime safety to regional partners, and recognized the importance of such endeavors in promoting regional peace and stability.
