ABSTRACT
Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are central players in the transnational market for force that unites power and profit in complex ways, and reconfigures state sovereignty, blurring the locus of authority and control. The inadequacy of existing mechanisms for holding PMSCs, their employees and subcontractors, as well as the relevant states, accountable, allowed PMSCs to operate with a liberty verging on impunity. This chapter briefly outlines the choices of states to outsource security and military needs, evaluates the inadequacies in existing domestic and international legal regimes that give rise to the need for private regulation, and in line with the overarching theme of the volume, engages contract as a potential regulatory instrument. The analysis draws on incomplete contracting theory to review a selection of publicly-available contracts and examines the International Code of Conduct (ICoC), a recent transnational initiative. The chapter concludes with some concerns about the limitations of regulating security through contract and identifies directions for future research.
