ABSTRACT

Critics who lodge the harshness objection against luck egalitarianism have interpreted the theory as claiming it is sufficient to justify a disadvantage that it was avoidable against a background of equal opportunities no matter the content of these opportunities. Luck egalitarianism, sensibly interpreted, must incorporate an opportunity principle that specifies what class of opportunities, if any, should be cushioned against disadvantage. The most plausible version of this principle protects some options and because of this, luck egalitarianism does not have some of the implications its critics regard as overly harsh. According to luck egalitarianism, disadvantages that are due to the disadvantaged person's bad luck are genuinely inegalitarian, while disadvantages that are of one's own making are not. Luck egalitarianism is often misinterpreted as the view according to which it is sufficient to justify a disadvantage that it was avoidable against the background of equal opportunities no matter the content of these opportunities.