ABSTRACT
Warren Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer raises intriguing questions concerning rationality, cyclic preferences, and resoluteness. The case of the self-torturer is supposed to illustrate that cyclic preferences can be rational and to suggest that, in cases where they are, rationality calls for some form of resoluteness. Criticisms of the case have largely focused on resisting the idea that the case of the self-torturer is a case of rational cyclic preferences. 1 My sense is that the responses to these criticisms by defenders of the puzzle are compelling and that the puzzle really does challenge some traditional assumptions about (instrumental) rationality. 2 But I also think that what makes the puzzle of the self-torturer puzzling has not been properly identifi ed. The puzzle, it seems, is that a series of rational choices foreseeably leads the self-torturer to an option that serves his preferences worse than the one with which he started. But this is a very misleading way of casting the puzzle raised by the case of the self-torturer. My aim in this
ABSTRACT The puzzle of the self-torturer raises intriguing questions concerning rationality, cyclic preferences, and resoluteness. Interestingly, what makes the case puzzling has not been clearly pinpointed. The puzzle, it seems, is that a series of rational choices foreseeably leads the self-torturer to an option that serves his preferences worse than the one with which he started. But this is a very misleading way of casting the puzzle. I pinpoint the real puzzle of the self-torturer and, in the process, reveal a neglected but crucial dimension of instrumental rationality.
