ABSTRACT
In Quinn’s view, it is clear that the self-torturer needs to pick an acceptable stopping point and then resolutely stick to his plan. But this approach is not supported by the prevailing theory of instrumental rationality, which prohibits an agent from ‘forgo[ing] something that he would in fact prefer to get, all things considered’ (205). Given that, for any setting n between 0 and 999, the self-torturer prefers to stop at setting n + 1 than to stop at setting n, and given that, when the self-torturer is at setting n, stopping at setting n + 1 is still an available option (in the sense that, were the self-torturer to decide that he should stop at setting n + 1 he could), stopping at setting n, is according to the prevailing theory of instrumental rationality, impermissible. Quinn thus rejects the prevailing theory of instrumental rationality in favor of a theory that requires some resoluteness. At the heart of the theory is
the principle that a reasonable strategy that correctly anticipated all later facts (including facts about preferences) still binds. On such a theory of rationality some contexts of choice fall under the authority of past decisions….In these contexts… [a]n agent is not rationally permitted to change course even if doing so would better serve his preferences . (207)
Presented somewhat more formally, Quinn’s reasoning in favor of resoluteness can be captured as follows:
P1: The self-torturer’s cyclic preferences are rationally permissible.
