ABSTRACT
That said, it is enough to ground the possibility of a legitimate form of doxastic autonomy or self-governance. Insofar as my beliefs are shaped by my own activity in responding to my evidence, they can be attributed to me rather than to some passive, subpersonal mechanism. And while in the moment of epistemic temptation, I will not be in a position to evaluate whether or not I have gotten it right in exercising doxastic self-control, I will often be able to see it retrospectively as an event of correctly resisting the infl uence of corrupting forces on my beliefs (although I will sometimes come to recognize it as a mistaken exhibition of dogmatism). If I manage to maintain my well-supported belief that completing a PhD in philosophy is a reasonable goal to pursue because I have the ability to write a successful dissertation, even though I am periodically assailed with self-doubt as a result of fear combined with stereotype threat, this will be in part due to me and not just to a fortunate amount of stability in my evidence. It will have been an instance of being not only self-governing with respect to my actions over time, but with respect to my beliefs.
