ABSTRACT
Presumably there are questions we could ask Ray to test these explanations. Suppose we ask him those questions and it turns out that none of them is an accurate description of his experience between giving his two answers. We concoct some more explanations and ask him about those, but they aren’t correct either. In the end, Ray admits that he just believed one thing at one time and another thing at another; in fact, he wasn’t even aware that his beliefs on the matter had changed until Bill asked the later question. 1
In that case it seems to me that there is something wrong, from a point of view of epistemic rationality, with Ray’s sequence of beliefs. I hope the reader shares that intuition with me. If not, here’s a piece of initial evidence for it: Observing Ray’s behavior, why are we inclined to ask him the kinds of questions I mentioned above? Why do we look for an explanation of his change in position? I submit that, in Davidsonian fashion, we are attempting to rationalize Ray’s pattern of responses. If Ray just shifted from one view to another – without any new or remembered information, or even a conscious mind-change in between – then we would level a charge of irrationality. Imputations of irrationality are a last resort in the game of interpretation, so our questions seek other viable options.
