ABSTRACT
Second, if identity or self-governance accounts of rational belief are patterned after their practical brethren, they will suggest the existence of a kind of reason that I don’t think exists. It’s diffi cult to discriminate intuitively cases in which no reason for a course of action exists from cases in which such a reason exists but is very small (Schroeder 2007 , Ch. 5). Nevertheless, consider Bratman’s case in which he has to choose between two routes (Highway 280 and Highway 101) to reach San Francisco and each route is equally good. Suppose that far before reaching the relevant junction, Bratman makes up his mind to take 280. Now he is approaching the junction at which the decisive turn must be made. As many authors have emphasized, there are often reasons not to reconsider a settled intention. 17 But suppose Bratman re-opens the question anyway, and is considering once more which way to go. It would be awfully strange for Bratman to treat his past intention as generating any kind of consideration in favor of taking 280. Similarly, when Bill prompts Ray to think again about who will win the game, it would be odd for Ray to cite the belief he formed while talking to Ken as part of a reason to think the A’s will win. 18 Yet the identity and self-governance accounts seem to make these earlier attitudes into reasons for later actions, or at least allow those earlier attitudes to generate reasons infl uencing later actions. These accounts thus posit a kind of later-time reason (even during reconsideration) of which I’m suspicious.
