Notes

Howson and Urbach 2006 ), some assume the concurrent answer (e.g. (e.g. Lewis 2010 and Strevens 2015 ), and some are silent on the matter (e.g. Easwaran 2011 and Weisberg 2011 ).

8 I’m assuming here that the time at which a subject ‘gets’ evidence is the time at which the evidence becomes relevant to our epistemic evaluation of the subject. But I do not take this to be controversial, since this assumption is shared by virtually everyone. (Consider: if this were not the case, then the oft repeated truism that a subject’s beliefs should take all of her evidence into account (the so-called ‘Principle of Total Evidence’) would be untenable. If, for example, one characterized ‘receiving evidence’ such that the time at which a subject received visual evidence was one minute (or one year, or one century) before the light struck her eyes, it would be implausible to say that she should take all of her evidence into account.)

9 See Lewis ( 1980 ). 10 Other proponents of this kind of stance regarding epistemic norms include

Feldman ( 2001 ) and Wolterstorff ( 2010 ). 11 One might reasonably want to hear more about what, exactly, it means to say

that Conditionalization is ‘an ideal at which to aim’ or an ideal performance norm’, and about how this understanding of Conditionalization interacts with things like a subject’s cognitive capabilities and ought-implies-can. I describe one natural way of spelling out these notions and their interaction, using the framework of Kratzer ( 1991 ), in Appendix B.