ABSTRACT
Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway are both known for their rejection of dualism, that is, the view that the world contains both material and immaterial substances. Even though their move to replace dualism with a form of vitalist monism is similar, it is tempting to see their views as profoundly different. Cavendish writes that all is matter, inviting us to interpret her as a kind of materialist. Conway, by contrast, insists that the kernel of reality is spirit, inviting us to construe her as a kind of immaterialist. We argue, however, that in the end, their metaphysical views are quite similar. Both Cavendish and Conway attribute to their one type of substance properties that dualists distribute across their two types of substance. Both also insist that nature has no place for either immaterial spirits or purely mechanical bodies. In exploring their arguments against dualism and in favor of vitalist monism, we pay particular attention to the ways in which Cavendish and Conway engage with two of dualism’s traditional motivations: (a) the philosophical demand to explain the orderly workings of nature and (b) the theological demand for human exceptionalism among God’s creatures. If Cavendish is a materialist, her matter is spiritualized. If Conway is a spiritualist, her spirit is materialized. Rather than split the dualist’s wishbone, they reject it altogether in favor of a single substance that borrows features from each of the dualists’ two. Whatever differences in terms and emphasis, Cavendish and Conway reject the connection, endorsed by dualists, between self-activity and immateriality. Material nature, according to both, is self-active. While Cavendish vocally stresses the material, Conway stresses the self-active.
