ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses the subject matter of the volume, constitutional revision as an indicator of constitutional acceleration, by showing how the option for rigid amendment rules and various limitations at the foundational moment of Romanian constitutionalism generated as a long-term perverse effect powerful. Majoritarian democracy has partly receded and given way to a new form of constitutional pluralism by virtue of which traditional politics is complemented with and partly supplanted by patterns and mechanisms of apolitical decision-making. The most apparent informal changes have resulted from adjudication by the constitutional Court. The discourses of anti-corruption and judicial independence operate as quasi-constitutional processes that significantly affect the functioning of the constitutional system. In what concerns the functioning of the judicial system, anti-corruption, and independence as systemic autonomy are mutually reinforcing desiderata and discourses. The empowering of the Constitutional Court and the constitutional entrenchment of judicial autonomy led to the rise of additional power centers in the constitutional framework.
