ABSTRACT
Th e fi nal form of peculiarity in privatised migration control to be considered here is the special way in which it skews the market in a State. Th at is, as presented above, it skews the very composition of the labour and other markets through the construction of noncitizens as (i) welcome or unwelcome territorially, and then (ii) able or unable to access the internal State frameworks. Th is deviates from traditional neoliberal privatisation discourse. While Milton Friedman writes that the free market will protect the ‘foreign-born’ from xenophobia because it masks the producer and emphasises economic motivations (Friedman 1962 , 21), the measures discussed here reintroduce distinctions, either stopping persons from participating in the market at all or constraining their participation. Friedman himself has identifi ed such measures as problematic. In a lecture given in 1978, he said (Friedman 1978 , min11-12):
It might appear from this that, for Friedman, people crossing the physical border is a good thing, so long as their entry into internal frameworks is restricted. Th is is not so. He wants immigrants to enter the work force freely. Friedman is against access for immigrants to the welfare state (hence the desire to keep them ‘illegal’); which is problematic, but it is not the same thing (Moore 2013; see also argument between Rose and Milton Friedman in Varadarajan 2006 ). He is in favour of immigrants entering the State freely, and having full access to the social community of the State, where that community, for the neoliberal, does not include providing welfare services. Th is shows that the peculiar privatisation of migration control is problematic also within a neoliberal framework.
