ABSTRACT
Moving activities from a State into the private sector makes this emphasis on economic calculations more pronounced, potentially obscuring intended outcomes of policy. As argued in the section above, this is the case with regard to both explicit privatisation, and implicit forms. It is widely understood that private entities may be driven by profi t, interested in quality of service-delivery insofar as it reinforces market-share, thought here are exceptions to this, as seen in the case of UK-based airline, XL Airways, which is reported to have refused to fl y deportees, explaining that it had ‘sympathy for all dispossessed people in the world (quoted in Verkaik 2007 ) and NGOs that also fulfi l many contracts for non-State involvement in migration control. However, the focus here is on those private entities mostly driven by profi t motives. Such motives, within existing structures, do not promote humanitarian considerations. Indeed, some, like Enrique Ballesteros, OHCHR Special Rapporteur on the Use of Mercenaries, go further. In the case of mercenaries, he has observed a competitive advantage for those able to act outside international law (quoted in Vines 2000 , 172). Th is translates easily into the migration control sector, where several writers have suggested that the private actors are engaged by States in order to circumvent diplomatic limitations and international commitments which restrict the actions open to States acting as States (e.g. Gammeltoft -Hansen 2013 , 36).
